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Abstract 
      Tournaments are well known to be vulnerable to collusion as shown by the impossibility 
theorem in Ishiguro (2004), which asserts that efficient effort levels are impossible to be 
implemented through a collusion-proof contract. However, we argue that this impossibility is a 
product of simple mechanisms that prevail in collusion-proof mechanism design. In this paper, we 
explore more sophisticated mechanisms with discrimination and asymmetric information to 
prevent collusion, outlining the principle of “divide and conquer”. As a result, we establish a 
possibility theorem of implementing efficient effort levels, and thus break down the impossibility 
theorem in Ishiguro (2004). 
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Divide and Conquer 
Zhijun Chen 
1. Introduction  
Rank-order tournaments prevail in organizations where the performance of 
agents is hard to verify, such as R&D sectors and bureaucratic institutions. They are 
proven to be effective in resolving the moral hazard of agents due to non-observable 
actions, as well as the credibility of the principal due to non-verifiable performance
1.  
However, it is also well known that tournaments are vulnerable to collusion
2. By 
shirking cooperatively rather than working individually, agents can maintain their 
rank orders, and thus save on their effort costs. Indeed, the phenomenon of collusion 
in tournaments is quite prevalent in bureaucratic environments, poring a permanent 
threat to efficiency and bringing an austere challenge, both in practice and theory, to 
politicians and scholars. 
Recent research on mechanism design under collusion has made much progress, 
while little attention has been paid to tournaments. Ishiguro (2004) is the first attempt 
to resolve this problem. He introduces discrimination policy in a collusion-proof 
contract and shows that only asymmetric effort levels, in which the favored agent 
works and disfavored shirks, can be implemented. Furthermore, the paper presents an 
impossibility theorem, which asserts that efficient effort levels are impossible to be 
implemented in a collusion-proof contract. 
We argue that this impossibility is the result of too simple mechanisms used in 
collusion-proof mechanism design. In this paper, we explore more sophisticated 
mechanisms and establish a possibility theorem of preventing collusion in 
tournaments. The sophisticated mechanisms are based on the principle of “divide and 
conquer” which asserts that to prevent collusion, the principal should create conflicts 
between the agents and thus undermine the coalition. The implication of this principle 
comes from the old wisdom of “divide and conquer” in the history of politics, which 
plays a key role in preventing collusion of cliques in bureaucracy and is thus preferred 
by the monarch.   
In this paper, we introduce two kinds of instruments for preventing collusion: 
discrimination and manipulation of information, both are quite commonly used in 
organizations. 
Discrimination, in which people having the same qualifications are treated 
differently, is an effective measure to bring on conflicts. Being discriminated in 
organizations, agents have different status quo utility levels when participating in the 
coalition and thus will claim different stakes of collusion. This causes conflicts among 
agents. By re-allocating stakes of collusion inside the coalition, these conflicts can be 
reconciled at the cost of shrinking the stakes of collusion if side transfers entail 
                                                        
1  See Green and Stokey (1983), Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) about the basic ideas of 
tournament model. 
2  For instance, Mookherjee (1984) has pointed out this vulnerability of collusion in tournament.  3
transaction costs. This leads to a loss of efficiency in the coalition and thus helps the 
principal in preventing collusion. 
As the first step, we introduce an open discrimination mechanism into the 
tournament, where agents’ identities of being favored or not are common knowledge. 
Under the perfect collusion assumption, we show that the open discrimination 
mechanism is not sufficient to prevent collusion and thus efficient effort levels cannot 
be implemented. This result coincides with Ishiguro (2004)’s impossibility theorem. 
The intuition of this impossibility appears quite simple. The perfect collusion 
assumption implies that a side contract would be enforceable and side transfers would 
be costless, and thus reallocation of the stakes would be costless as well. As a result, 
an open discrimination mechanism creates no loss of efficiency under perfect 
collusion and thus cannot prevent collusion.   
To break down this impossibility result, a more powerful mechanism must be 
explored, which involves in another important instrument of preventing collusion: 
manipulation of information. 
Asymmetric information in organizations causes distortions of efficiency. As a 
established result, it can be utilized to undermine the coalition. By controlling the 
revelation of information, the principal can introduce asymmetric information 
between agents, and thus bring on conflicts in the coalition. The trade-off between the 
rent extraction and the distortion of efficiency leads to the inefficient outcome of the 
coalition, and this can improve the principal’s welfare.   
Based on this principle, we introduce a hidden discrimination mechanism into 
the tournament, in which agents’ identities are hidden information known only by the 
principal. By revealing this piece of information only to one agent, which we called 
the informed agent, the principal brings asymmetric information into the coalition. 
The informed agent, who now owns private information on identities, wants to claim 
the information rents for truth-telling. This causes a trade-off between rent-extraction 
and distortion of efficiency, which shrinks the stakes of collusion and thus leads to 
inefficiency of the coalition. As a result, it is possible to implement efficient effort 
levels, as shown in proposition 4, which breaks down the impossibility theorem by 
Ishiguro (2004). 
The possibility theorem, which hinges on the principle of “divide and conquer”, 
induces us to review the literature in collusion-proof mechanism design, which is 
pioneered by Tirole (1986), and developed by Laffont & Martimort (1997, 2000) and 
Faure-Grimaud, Laffont & Martimort (2003). Many of the key contributions to this 
literature are based on the Principle of Collusion-Proofness, which asserts that, for 
any initial contract which is not collusion-proof, the principal can replicate the same 
outcome by offering some collusion-proof contract. Under the collusion-proof 
mechanism, no agent can benefit from joining the coalition, and thus no side contract 
arises in equilibrium. As a result, without loss of generality, the principal need only 
concentrate on designing a collusion-proof mechanism. In general, the principle holds 
under the circumstances where the principal can benefit from preventing collusion, 
which are the cases being looked at in this paper. 
In spite of this powerful principle, little attention has been paid to further  4
developments of new instruments and mechanisms, especially in the arena of moral 
hazard. A brief investigation of the literature shows that the existing mechanisms for 
collusion-proofness are quite simple. Under these mechanisms, the coalition is viewed 
as an entity or black box, and its efficient allocation is attained through an enforceable 
side contract. By the Principle of Collusion-Proofness, the principal can design a 
grand contract to replicate this efficient outcome for the coalition, leaving the 
coalition sufficient stakes of collusion for the sake of collusion-proofness. This incurs 
huge costs of preventing collusion if the stakes of collusion are very large, and leads 
to inefficient outcomes, as illustrated by the impossibility result in the tournament.   
Therefore, more sophisticated mechanisms, such as hidden discrimination 
mechanism based on the principle of divide and conquer, have appeal to be developed, 
and this motivates the further research in future. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a typical story of a 
bureaucracy is illustrated to highlight the basic idea of “divide and conquer”. In 
section 3, the basic framework of the paper is presented. We analyze the case of the 
simple mechanism without discrimination as a bench-mark in section 4, and then 
introduce the open discrimination mechanism and prove the impossibility result in 
section 5. As our key contribution, in section 6, we introduce the hidden 
discrimination mechanism, and prove the possibility theorem. Finally, concluding 
remarks are drawn in section 7.   
 
 
2. Hidden discrimination Mechanism: A Story 
    In this section, we illustrate the theory through a story drawn from bureaucratic 
environments. There are two offices in a bureaucratic department, and each has one 
dean (principal) and two employees (agents). The story takes place in office A. Dean 
A (Mr. Chen) assigns two identical and independent tasks to the agents respectively. 
Good performance will be achieved with higher probability if agents work hard, and it 
helps the dean to be promoted to the level of minister of the department. However, the 
dean cannot observe the agents’ effort levels. In order to resolve moral hazard, he 
creates a position of deputy dean for better-performing agent. As a result, one and 
only one agent will be promoted at the end of the game on the basis of agents’ relative 
performance.  
      However, agents have incentives to collude under this tournament mechanism. By 
shirking cooperatively rather than working hard, they maintain their relative 
performance, and thus benefit by saving as their effort costs. To sustain the collusion, 
the agents must seek a benevolent third party to design and enforce a side contract. To 
this end, they find that Dean B (Mr. Zhang) is the best candidate of the “benevolent” 
third party. As a competitor of Dean A for the position of minister, Dean B has the 
incentive to help the agents form a coalition, and thus benefits from undermining 
office A. As a result, Dean B is delighted to design a side contract, which is aimed at 
maximizing the total welfare of the agents. The side contract has the form of mutual 
insurance: both agents are assigned to shirk and whoever wins the high position must  5
pay side payments to his losing peer.   
    While  expecting the ongoing  collusion  between agents, the principal (Mr. Chen) 
will design a sophisticated mechanism to prevent collusion. From his vast experience 
in bureaucracies, Mr. Chen is familiar with the notion of “divide and conquer”, and 
employs a hidden discrimination mechanism. 
In this department, it is common knowledge that agent Mr. Li is Mr. Chen’s 
brother in law (see structure of department in Fig 1 below). At the beginning, Mr. 
Chen declares the rules of game as follows: by turning a prepared roulette, he will 
select a favored agent who is granted a higher chance of promotion; the realization of 
the random choice will be kept as a secret. However, Mr. Li can acquire this piece of 
information from his sister, Mr. Chen’s wife, and thus become an informed agent. 
Indeed, Mr. Chen is motivated to reveal this information only to Mr. Li, since he can 
introduce asymmetric information between agents in this way and thus bring conflicts 
into the coalition. The structure of the department is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1    Structure of the Department 
        Due to discrimination, the lucky agent who happens to be favored by chance has 
a higher status quo utility level than his peer, the unlucky one, and thus claims more 
stakes of collusion. As a result, the informed agent, Mr. Li, if he is unlucky, has 
incentives to mimic the lucky type. To prevent his misreporting, information rents 
must be given to Mr. Li, which brings a trade-off between the rents extraction and the 
distortion of efficiency in the coalition. This trade-off shrinks the stakes of collusion 
and incurs a loss of efficiency, and thus makes it possible to implement efficient effort 
levels. In this way, Mr. Chen beats his rival, Mr. Zhang. 
     
        
3. Basic Model 
We now present the basic model. A principal employs two agents to complete 
Minister of the 
Department 
Dean of Office A: 
Mr.Chen (Principal) 
Dean of Office B:   
Mr.Zhang (Third Party) 
Informed Agent:   
Mr. Li 
Uninformed Agent:
Mr. Wang  6
two identical and independent tasks. Agent i,  1, 2 i = , has two effort levels, low 
(shirk) and high (work), as denoted by {0,1}
i e ∈ , which cannot be observed by others. 
The output of agent  i  is observable but non-verifiable, with two values, good or bad, 
as denoted by  } , { q q qi ∈ , with  q q > . The probability of good performance is 
1 ()
i e π π =  (resp. 0 ()
i e π π = ) when the agent works (resp. shirks), with 10 10 π π >>> . 
Let  10 π ππ ∆= − . 
      The principal will devise a tournament to resolve the agents’ moral hazard, due to 
the non-verifiability of performance. He sets two positions, high and low, with prize 
T  and 0 respectively, and then assigns the positions to agents based on their relative 
performance. 
    The principal, who benefits only from agents’ good performance, is risk-neutral 
with his utility function expressed by: 
    ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ]
ij Ve e e R T ππ =+ − ,        
whereR is the principal’s revenue from agents’ good performance. 
    Agents  are  also  risk-neutral  and  protected by limited liability. The utility function 
of agent  i  is expressed as follows: 
     () () ( )
i
ii Ue pe T e ψ =− ,                              
where ( )
i e ψ is the disutility of effort 
i e , with ψ ψ = ) 1 (,  0 ) 0 ( = ψ and 0 > ψ , and 
where ) (e pi  represents the winning probability of agent i , given the effort 
pair ( , )
ij ee e = . For simplicity, we employ the following notation for different effort 
pairs: 
     ) 0 , 0 ( = e , (1,0) e =   , ) 1 , 0 ( ~ = e ,  ) 1 , 1 ( = e . 
    T h a t  i s ,  e   represents the effort pair that agent  iworks and his peer shirks, and 
vice versa fore ~ .  
 
 
4. Benchmark: Simple Mechanism 
4.a Contract without Collusion 
    In the absence of collusion, if the prize of the high position is sufficiently high, 
then the efficient effort pair  ) 1 , 1 ( = e can be implemented through the following  7
simple symmetric mechanism: if agent  i has better performance than agent  j , that 
is,  j i q q > , then agent  iobtains the high position, and his peer, agent  j gets the low 
position; if both agents achieve the same performance, that is,  j i q q = , then each 
receives the high position with probability 
1
2
. Given this fair promotion rule, 
agenti’s probability of winning is     
11
(, ) P r { |} P r { |} P r { |}
22
11
( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))(1 ( ))
22
ij
ii j i j i j
ij i j i j
p e e q q eq q q eq q q e
ee e e e e ππ π π π π
=>+ = = + = =
=− + + − − .
 
  For the efficient effort pair  (1,1) e = to be implemented at the equilibrium, each 
agent must benefit from working rather than shirking. Under this mechanism, if agent 
i  works rather than shirks, he can obtain utility
1
2
T π ψ ∆ − , which equals his 
expected prize of winning given his peer works,
1
2
T π ∆ , minus his effort cost ψ . 
This leads to the following proposition: 
[Proposition 1]:  In the absence of collusion, the efficient effort pair e can be 








[Proof]: The proof is obvious and is thus omitted. 
   Denote  T  as the incentive power of the contract, which is the spread of the 
prizes of the two positions. Proposition 1 asserts that, to implement the high effort 
levels, the principal must provide high enough incentive power to meet agents’ 
incentive compatibility conditions.     
 
4.b Collusion under Simple Mechanism 
   Unfortunately, this contract is vulnerable to collusion. If agents collude on the 
effort pair e, they can save their effort costs  ψ 2 , while keeping their relative 
performance or rank order. The existence of stakes of collusion, which equal to ψ 2,  
thus provides incentives for collusion. 
   To fix ideas, we will consider the case of perfect collusion. Assume a benevolent 
third party, who aims to maximize total welfare of agents, and can design and enforce  8
a side contract. The side contract has the following form: whoever wins the prize must 
pay a side payment  s to his losing peer. Under this side contract, the ex post prizes 
of the high and low position become Ts − and  s  respectively, and agent i ’s 
expected utility can be then expressed as ˆ () () [ ] [ 1 () ] ( )
i
ii i Ue peT s pes e ψ =− + − − , 
where  ) ( ˆ e Ui   is the utility level of agent  i  in the coalition with effort paire. 







, the side payment 
1
2
sT = ensures the utility level of the agent
1 ˆ () ( )
2
i
i Ue T e ψ =− , which leads to the 
agents’ optimal effort pair(, )
ij ee e = . Both agents are fully insured under collusion, 
and thus have no incentives to work. This immediately results in the following 
proposition: 
[Proposition 2]: Under the simple mechanism, only low effort levels can be 
implemented  under  collusion.                          
     The implication is quite clear. Under the simple mechanism, agents are 
symmetric in the grand contract and thus have the same status quo utility when 
participating in the coalition. The coalition can therefore be sustained through a 
simple anonymous side contract, which offers full insurance for agents and thus 
provides no incentives for working.   
 
 
5. Sophisticated Mechanism with Open Discrimination   
    The impossibility result in proposition 2 appeals to us to introduce new 
principles and explore more sophisticated mechanism for preventing collusion. While 
rethinking the methodology, it appears obvious that the most effective way of 
preventing collusion is to undermine the coalition directly through some exogenous 
force such as law. For instance, the principal may employ a spy to look for evidence 
of collusion, and then punish the collusive agents if the spy delivers hard evidence. 
However, this is mission-impossible in general, due to the non-verifiability of the 
evidence and some other difficulties in law.   
For this reason, the mechanism designer must seek out endogenous conflicts, and 
utilize it to break down the coalition. This is possible if he can design more 
sophisticated mechanisms and create conflicts in the coalition, which brings on the 
principle of “divide and conquer”.   
Discrimination–the act of treating people with the same qualifications differently 
in either an explicit or implicit way–is one way to bring conflicts. Being treated 
differently, agents have different status quo utility levels while participating in the 
coalition. The favored agent, who has a higher status, will claim more stakes of 
collusion due to his higher participation costs. This creates a conflict between the  9
agents. To sustain the coalition, the stakes of collusion must be redistributed through a 
side transfer, and this will shrink the virtual stakes of collusion if the side transfer 
entails transaction costs.   
   Discrimination  in organizations  can be classified into two kinds, open and hidden 
discrimination. In open discrimination, the identities of agents, that is, who is favored 
and who is not, are common knowledge, while in hidden discrimination, they are 
hidden information. We concentrate on the open discrimination mechanism in this 
section, and will proceed to hidden discrimination mechanism in the next section.   
 
5.a  Open  Discrimination  Mechanism 
    Discrimination  in  promotion  opportunity is quite a common act in bureaucracies. 
The favored agent has priority to get to the high position even if his performance is 
not better than his peer’s. The open discrimination rule in tournaments can be 
illustrated as follows: 
    I f  a g e n t  ihas better performance than his peer, say  j i q q > , then agent  igets 
the high position, and his peer, agent j , gets the low position, and vice versa.   If  both 




. However, when both have a good performance, that is, when 
ij qqq == , then the tie is broken through a biased lottery, which gifts probability 
2
1
> v  of winning to the favored agent, probability 
2
1
1 < −v  of winning to the 
disfavored agent. We assume  1 v < to guarantee that the lottery is fully stochastic. 
At the beginning of the game, the principal tosses an unbiased coin to select the 
favored agent and declares the outcome to both agents. The identities of agents are 
thus common knowledge in this mechanism.   
Denote the lucky agent, who is selected to be favored at random, as agentl, and 
the unlucky agent, who is selected to be disfavored, as agentu . Given the effort 
pair ( , )
ij ee e = , the probability of wining for the lucky and unlucky agent, denoted as 
l p and u p respectively, can be expressed as follows: 
1
( , ) Pr{ | } Pr{ | } Pr{ | }
2
1
( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))(1 ( ))
2
ij
li j i j i j
iji j i j
p e e qq ev qqq e qqq e
ee v e e e e ππ π π π π
=>+ = = + = =
=− + + − − ,
  10
1
( , ) Pr{ | } (1 )Pr{ | } Pr{ | }
2
1
( )(1 ( )) (1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))(1 ( ))
2
ij
ui j i j i j
ij i j i j
p e e qq e v qqq e qqq e
ee v e e e e ππ π π π π
=>+ − = = + = =
=− + − + − − . 
Under the open discrimination mechanism, the side contract designed by the third 
party can be non-anonymous, based on different identities. The timing of game is as 
follows: 
[Timing of Open discrimination Mechanism]: 
1. The principal designs the grand contract, which includes: the lottery for the lucky 
and unlucky agents, and the prize for the high position; 
2. Both agents decide whether or not to accept the grand contract. The grand contract 
will be approved if no agent vetoes, and the game continues; 
3. The principal tosses an unbiased coin to select a lucky agent, and declares the 
outcome in public; 
4. A benevolent third party designs the non-anonymous side contract based on agents’ 
identities. The contract contains: the coalition effort levels and the side transfers from 
high position to low position, for both lucky and unlucky agent respectively; 
5. Both agents decide whether or not to accept the side contract. The side contract will 
be ratified if no agent vetoes, and will be enforced by the third party; 
6. Both agents choose effort levels simultaneously, which are privately observed; 
7. Each agent’s output realizes. The principal announces the winner according to their 
relative performance and identities. Both grand transfer and side payment are 
enforced. 
 
5.b Impossibility of Collusion-Proofness   
The principal wants to implement efficient effort pair e  under the open 
discrimination mechanism. The set of incentive feasible grand contracts he designs is 
denoted as
ED G . Given the grand contract, the third party can design a non-anonymous 
side contract, with different side payment  l s  and  u s for the lucky and unlucky agent 
respectively. Denote  [ ( )]
ED Se  as the coalition which assigns effort pair ( , )
ij ee e = to 
agents, and  ( )
ED Se as the set of incentive feasible side contracts for the coalition 
[( ) ]
ED Se . The optimization program of side contracting for the coalition  )] ( [ e S
ED  is 
as follows: 
)] ( [ e S
ED : 
{,}
ˆˆ max ( ) ( )
lu
lu ss Ue Ue +  
Subject to:  11
[( ) ] l CIR e :  ) ( ) ( ˆ e U e U l l ≥  
[( ) ] u CIR e :  ) ( ) ( ˆ e U e U u u ≥  
[( ) ] l CIC e :  ˆˆ () () ll Ue Ue ≥    
[( ) ] u CIC e :  ˆˆ () () uu Ue Ue ≥    
] [CLL : , 0 lu Ts s ≥≥  
where, subscript  l and u  represent the lucky and unlucky type respectively. In the 
program,  [( ) ] l CIR e and  [( ) ] u CIR e are the coalition participation constraints for the 
lucky and unlucky agent respectively; [( ) ] l CIC e  and [( ) ] u CIC e are the coalition 
incentive compatibility constraints for the lucky and unlucky agent respectively. 
     Expecting the on-going collusion game, the principal must design a 
collusion-proof grand contract in order to implement the efficient effort pair e . 
However, this is impossible under the open discrimination mechanism, as claimed by 
the following proposition:   
[Proposition 3](Impossibility of Collusion-Proofness):  Under the open 
discrimination mechanism, it is impossible to implement efficient effort paire in a 
collusion-proof contract. 
[Proof ]:    Rewrite the program of  )] ( [ e S
ED as follows:   
[( ) ] l CIR e :  () ( ) () () ll u u l peT s pe s pe Tψ −+ ≥ −  
[( ) ] u CIR e :  () ( ) () () uu l l u peT s pe s pe Tψ −+ ≥ −  
[( ) ] l CIC e :  [( ) ( ) ] [ ] ll l u pe pe T s s ψ − −− ≤    
[( ) ] u CIC e :  [ ( ) ( )][ ] uu u l pe pe T s s ψ − −− ≤    
] [CLL :   0 , lu ss T ≤≤  
     It is easy to check that given any incentive feasible prizeT , the following side 
contract:  () ul sp e T = ,  () lu sp e T =   satisfies all the constraints above. The feasibility 
of coalition  )] ( [ e S
ED t h u s   i m p l i e s   t h e   i m p o s s i b i l i t y   r e s u l t .             Q . E . D                      
 
    Further  intuitions  of  the  proposition  can be drawn. Under the open discrimination 
mechanism, the identities of the agents, that is, who is favored or not, are common  12
knowledge and thus contractible in the grand contract as well as in the side contract. 
Therefore, the third party can design a non-anonymous side contract based on agents’ 
identities to reconcile the conflicts in the coalition due to discrimination. As incentive 
power T increases, the coalition participating constraints [( ) ] u CIR e and coalition 
incentive constraints [( ) ] l CIC e  become more stringent, which implies that the 
unlucky type has more incentive to quit the coalition, and the lucky type has more 
incentive to misbehave. However, the trade-offs can be resolved by designing the side 
payments l s and u s based on agents’ identities: () ul sp e T = ,  () lu sp e T = . Under this 
side contract, agents’ utility levels are  ˆ () () ll Ue pe T =  for the lucky type and 
ˆ () () uu Ue pe T =  for the unlucky type respectively, which ensure that the coalition 
participation constraints are upheld. Furthermore, the virtual incentive 
power lu Tss −− is reduced to zero, and this ensures that the coalition incentive 
compatibility constraints are met. Under perfect collusion, reallocating stakes through 
a side transfer is costless, and entails no loss of efficiency in the coalition.   
   Ishiguro (2004) obtains the same result in tournaments. The discrimination 
mechanism he employs is quite different from ours: agents are discriminated in 
reward schemes rather than in promotion chances, according to their exogenous and 
explicit characteristics, such as sex. Under the open discrimination mechanism he 
introduces, Ishiguro (2004) proves that the efficient effort paire is impossible to be 
implemented in a collusion-proof contract. Furthermore, he shows that, only the less 
efficient effort paire   , which assigns the favored agent to work and disfavored agent to 
shirk, can be implemented if the principal reduces the incentive power of the 
disfavored agent to zero. In this discrimination mechanism, the disfavored agent has 
no incentive to work at all under the grand contract, and is thus not induced to 
participate in the coalition. 
 
 
6. Sophisticated Mechanism with Hidden Discrimination 
6.a    Hidden Discrimination Mechanism 
      The impossibility conclusion in proposition 3 shows that the open discrimination 
mechanism is not powerful enough to prevent collusion. As we pointed out, under the 
open discrimination mechanism, the third party can design a non-anonymous side 
contract, based on agent’s identities, to reallocate the stakes of collusion, and thus 
reconcile the conflicts in the coalition. 
    Therefore, revealing the information of agents’ identities publicly is not an 
optimal strategy for the principal. This suggests that the principal should hide the  13
piece of information and reveal it only to one agent, by which he can introduce 
asymmetric information between agents. By the Revelation Principle, the informed 
agent who now owns the information of agents’ identities, wants to claim information 
rents for truth-telling to the uninformed third party. The trade-off between rent 
extraction and distortion of efficiency creates a loss of efficiency in the coalition, 
which makes it possible to implement efficient effort levels. Therefore, controlling 
information structure sheds additional light on the principle of “divide and conquer”. 
          The time sequence of this hidden discrimination mechanism is as follows: 
[Timing of Hidden discrimination Mechanism]: 
1. Principal designs the grand contract, which specifies who the informed agent is, the 
lottery for the lucky and unlucky agents, and the prize for the high position; 
2. Both agents decide whether or not to accept the grand contract. The grand contract 
is approved if no agent vetoes, and the game continues; 
3. Principal wheels a roulette to select a lucky agent, which assigns probability 
01 α <<   of being lucky to the informed agent and probability1 α − of being lucky to 
the uninformed agent. The outcome will be revealed to only the informed agent, say, 
agenti; 
4. A benevolent and uninformed third party designs the side contract, which specifies 
effort levels and non-anonymous side transfers from high position to low position;   
5. Both agents decide whether or not to accept the side contract. The side contract is 
ratified if no agent vetoes, in which case it is enforced by the third party; 
6. Both agents choose effort levels simultaneously, which is privately observed; 
7. Agents’ outputs realize; the principal announces the winner based on their relative 
performance and status. Both grand and side contract are enforced. 
[Remark]: In the final stage, the principal will only announce the winner, and no 
information about agents’ identities will be revealed. This ensures that no side 
contract based on the ex post information of identities can be drawn. Moreover, the 
assumption  1 v <  ensures that the third party cannot infer agents’ identities from the 
final outcome. 
 
6.b  Program  of  Side  Contracting 
When designing the side contract under hidden discrimination, the third party 
now faces two kinds of agents: the informed agent with adverse selection and moral 
hazard, and the uninformed agent with moral hazard only. By the Revelation Principle, 
without loss of generality, the third party can devise a direct side contract, which 
assigns a menu of effort levels  {, }{ (,) , (,) }
ij ij
lu l u u l E EE ee ee == and side 
payments { , } {( , ),( , )}
ij ij
lu lu u l SS S s ss s == for the agents, where the superscripts iand 
j represent the informed and uninformed agent respectively, and the subscripts  land 
u represent the lucky and unlucky type. For instance, 
i
l e  represents the effort level  14
assigned to the informed lucky agent, and
i
l s  is the side payment from the informed 
lucky agent to his peer if he wins.   
Suppose the third party wants to form the coalition  [ ( )]
ID Se   and implement the 
effort pair ( , )
ij ee e = . For the sake of truth-telling by the informed agent, the third 
party must ensure that the following truth-telling constraints are satisfied: 
For the lucky type: 
[( ) ]
i
l TT e :  , ˆˆ (, ) (, )
ii j i i j
llu l uul Uee U ee ≥  
[( ) ]
i
l TM e :  , ˆˆ ˆ (, ) (, )
ii j i i j
llu l uul Uee U ee ≥  
For the unlucky type:   
[( ) ]
i
u TT e :  , ˆˆ (,) (,)
ii j i ij
uu j u llu Uee U ee ≥  
[( ) ]
i
u TM e :  , ˆˆ ˆ (,) (,)
ii j i ij
uul u llu Uee U ee ≥  
where, the superscript i  represents the informed agent, and the subscript l and 
u represent the lucky and unlucky type respectively. Denoting  , ˆ (,)
ii j
lu u l Ue eas the 
utility level of the informed lucky agent when he misreports his type as unlucky, 
constraint  [( ) ]
i
l TT e thus guarantees his truth-telling of the lucky type; 
denoting , ˆ ˆ (,)
ii j
lu u l Ue e as the utility level of the informed lucky agent when he 
misreports as well as misbehaves, constraint [( ) ]
i
l TM e   thus guarantees his 
truth-telling and right-behaving. Similar notation is employed for the unlucky type. 
Furthermore, to form the coalition[ ( )]
ID Se , the third party must ensure that the 
side contract satisfies the following participation, incentive compatibility and limited 
liability constraints of the coalition: 
For the informed agent  i: 
[( ) ]
i
l CIR e :  ˆ (, ) ()
ii j
llu l Uee Ue ≥  
[( ) ]
i
u CIR e :  ˆ (,) ( )
ii j
uul u Uee Ue ≥  
[( ) ]
i
l CIC e :  ˆˆ ˆ (, ) (, )
ii j ii j
llu llu Uee Uee ≥  
[( ) ]
i
u CIC e :  ˆˆ ˆ (,) (,)
ii j ii j
uul uul Uee Uee ≥  
[( ) ] CLL e :  0, , ,
ii j j
lul u ssss T ≤≤ ,  15
For the uninformed agent j : 
[( ) ]
j CIR e :  ˆˆ (1 ) ( , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( ) ( )
jj i jj i
llu u u l l u Uee Uee U e Ue αα α α −+ ≥ − +  
[( ) ]
j
l CIC e :  ˆˆ ˆ (,) (,)
jj i jj i
llu llu Uee Uee ≥  
[( ) ]
j
u CIC e :  ˆˆ ˆ (,) (,)
jj i jj i
uul uul Uee Uee ≥  
   D e n o t i n g ( )
ID Se as the set of side contracts which satisfy all these constraints, we 
can present the optimization program of side contracting as follows: 
Program [ ( )]
ID Se : 
{( , )}
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ m a x ( ) ( ) ( ,)( 1 )(,)( 1 ) (,) (,)
[( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( ) ]
ij i i j i i j j j ij j i
llu uul l lu uul ES
ii j j
lul u
Ue Ue Uee Uee Uee Uee
Te e e e
αα α α
α ψ αψ αψ α ψ
+ = +− +− +
=− +− +− +
 
Subject to  ( , ) ( )
ID ES S e ∈ . 
The agents’ utility levels in the coalition can be expressed as follows: 
ˆ (, ) (, ) ( )[ 1 (, ) ] ()
ii j i j i i j j i
llu llu l llu u l Uee pee T s pee s e ψ =− + −−  
ˆ (,) (,) ( )[ 1 (,) ] ()
ii j i j i i j j i
uul uul u uul l u Uee pee Ts pee s e ψ =− + −−  
ˆ (,) (,) ( )[ 1 (,) ] ()
jj i j i j j i i j
llu l lu l l luu l Uee p eeTs p ees e ψ =− + −−  
ˆ (,) (,) ( )[ 1 (,) ] ()
jj i j i j j i i j
uul uul u uul l u Uee peeTs pees e ψ =− + −−  
Denoting
ii j
ll u TT ss =−− and 
ii j
uu l TT ss = −− as the virtual incentive power of 
the informed lucky agent and informed unlucky agent respectively, 
and ( ) ()( 1 )()( 1 )() ()
ii j j
lul u ee e e e α ψ αψ αψ α ψ Ψ = +− +− + as the expected effort costs,   
we can rewrite the program as follows: 
Program [ ( )]
ID Se : 
{,}
ˆˆ max ( ) ( ) ( )
ij
ES Ue Ue T e += − Ψ  
Subject to:   
[( ) ]
i
l TT e :  ˆˆ ( ,) (,)[(,) (,) ]
i ij i ij ij ij i
llu uul lul uul u Uee Uee pee pee T ≥+−  
[( ) ]
i
u TT e :  ˆˆ (,) (,)[(,) (,) ]
iij i ij ij ij i
uul llu llu ulu l Uee Uee pee pee T ≥−−  
[( ) ]
i
l TM e :  ˆˆ ˆˆ (,) (,)[(,) (,) ] () ()
i ij i ij ij ij i i i
llu uul lul uul u u u Uee Uee pee pee T e e ψψ ≥+− + −   16
[( ) ]
i
u TM e :  ˆˆ ˆˆ (, ) ) (, )[(, ) (, ) ] () ()
iij i ij ij ij i i i
uul llu llu ulu l l l Uee Uee pee peeT e e ψψ ≥−− + −  
[( ) ]
i
l CIR e :  ˆ (, ) ()
ii j
llu l Uee Ue ≥  
[( ) ]
i
u CIR e :  ˆ (,) ( )
ii j
uul u Uee Ue ≥  
[( ) ]
j CIR e :  ˆˆ (, )( 1 ) (, ) [ ( 1 ) () () ] ( )
ii j ii j
llu uul l u Uee Uee T Ue Ue e αα α α +− ≤− − + − Ψ  
[( ) ]
i
l CIC e :  ˆˆ [(, ) (, ) ] () ()
ij ij i i i
llu llu l l l p ee pee T e e ψψ −≤ −  
[( ) ]
i
u CIC e :  ˆˆ [ (,) (,) ] () ()
ij ij i i i
uul uul u u u p ee pee T e e ψψ −≤ −  
[( ) ]
j
l CIC e :  ˆˆ [(,) (,) ] () ()
ji ji i j j
ll u ll u u l l p ee peeT e e ψψ −≤ −  
[( ) ]
j
u CIC e :  ˆˆ [(,) (,) ] () ()
ji ji i j j
uul uul l u u p ee peeT e e ψψ −≤ −  
[( ) ] CLL e :   ,
ii
lu TT T T −≤ ≤. 
 
6.c Possibility of implementing  e 
We now proceed to the grand contract. To implement the efficient effort paire , 
the principal must ensure that all the coalitions  [ ( )]
ID Se (ee ≠ ) are not feasible under 
the grand contract, and this can be expressed as the following collusion-proof 
condition: 
] [





= ∪ . 
    The  following  proposition  claims  that, under the hidden discrimination 
mechanism, the efficient effort pair can be implemented with probabilityα : 
[Proposition 4](Possibility Theorem): Under the hidden discrimination 
mechanism, it is possible to implement the efficient effort paire . 
[Proof]: In the program  [ ( )]
ID Se (ee ≠ ), consider the truth-telling constraint of the 
unlucky type as follows: 
[( ) ]
i
u TT e :  ˆˆ (,) (,)[(,) (,) ]
iij i ij ij ij i
uul llu llu ulu l Uee Uee pee pee T ≥−− . 
Denoting  ˆˆ ˆ () ( , ) ( , )
ii j ii j
llu uul Ue U ee U e e ∆= − as the spread of utilities in the coalition, and 
() () () lu p ep ep e ∆= − as the probability premium, [( ) ]
i
u TT e then implies the lower 













    Moreover,  by  combing  two  coalition participation constraints 
[( ) ]
i
l CIR e and[ ( )]
j CIR e yields the lower bound of the utility spread: 
   











 These two inequalities imply the lower bound of 
i
l T  as the function of prize 
T : 
() 2 ()













On the other hand, the coalition limited liability constraint  [ ( )] CLL e implies the 
upper bound of the virtual incentive power of the lucky type: 
i
l TT ≤   
From the discrimination rule of the mechanism yields 
     (, ) ( 2 1 )()( )
ij i j
lu l u p ee v e e ππ ∆= − ,
2
1 () ( 2 1 ) pe v π ∆= − and () (, )
ij
lu p ep e e ∆> ∆ , 







[( ) ( ,) ] ( 1 )
2( )























** (, ) m a x ( , )
ij
lu ee Tv Tee α
≠ = as the maximal threshold of the incentive 
power, simple calculations yield:   
    
*
1
(1 ) (1 )
(, )








− ∆− ∆ − ∆ −   .  
   We thus claim that, as
*(, ) TT v α ≥ , all the coalitions [ ( )]
ID Se ( l Ee ≠ ) are not 
feasible. 
Now the remaining optimal coalition is , lu Ee Ee = = , which assigns both agents 
to work when the informed agent reports he is lucky, and to shirk otherwise. Therefore, 
the efficient effort pair  e can be implemented with probabilityα under this coalition, 
which is the assigned probability of the informed  agent  being  lucky.     Q.E.D  
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Two kinds of trade-offs exist in the coalition. The first one exists in the coalition 
participation constraints due to discrimination, which implies that the lucky agent will 
claim more stakes of collusion. The spread of utilities  ˆ() Ue ∆   measures this trade-off, 
and its lower bound is determined by the coalition participation constraints:   







∆≥ ∆ − = ∆−
−−
, 
where () () () () lu Ue U e U e peT ∆= − = ∆ is the discrimination rent. 
The second trade-off results from the asymmetric information between agents 
and exists in the truth-telling constraints. Rewrite the truth-telling constraint of 
unlucky type as follows: 
[( ) ]
i
u TT e :  ˆˆ (,) (,) (,)
iij i ij iji
uul llu lul Uee Uee p eeT ≥− ∆, 
where, the utility level of the unlucky type when he misreports, ˆ (, )
iij
ulu Uee, contains 
two terms: the first term, ˆ (, )
ii j
llu Uee, is the utility level of the lucky type who he wants 
to mimic; and the second term is the expected cost for his misreporting, which equals 
to the probability premium times the virtual incentive power of the lucky type. To 
ensure the truth-telling of the unlucky type, the cost of misreporting must be raised. 
This gives rise to the lower bound for the virtual incentive power, which is 
proportional to the spread of utility levels ˆ() Ue ∆ : 













    On the other hand, the increased virtual incentive power
i
l T will meet its upper 
bound implied by the coalition limited liability constraint. Combing two bounds 
yields 
























  is greater than one for (, )
ij
ll u E ee e = ≠ , and this leads to a break-down 
of the coalition. To resolve this conflict, the third party has to assign coalition l Ee = , 
and thus distorts the efficiency of the coalition. Defining the stakes of collusion as:   
ˆˆ ( ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] 2 ( )
ij
lu Se U e U e U e U e e ψ =+−+= − Ψ ,  
it then shrinks to2(1 ) α ψ −  under the hidden discrimination mechanism. As a result,  19
the efficient effort levels can be implemented with probabilityα , and the optimal 
coalition at the equilibrium is , lu Ee Ee = = .                                                
    The possibility theorem sheds light on the principle of “divide and conquer”. 
Discrimination in the grand contract gives rise to different status quo utility levels for 
agents, which implies different participation costs in the coalition. As the prize 
increases, the spread of the utility levels between lucky and unlucky type is widened 
due to discrimination, and this provides the unlucky type more incentive to mimic the 
lucky one. As the prize becomes large enough, the effects of countervailing incentives 
come into play, and the truth-telling constraint of the unlucky type becomes more 
stringent. This causes a trade-off between the rent extraction of the lucky type and the 
distortion of efficiency and shrinks the stakes of collusion as a result.     
 
        The optimal value of collusion-proof probability α can be determined 
endogenously. The principal wants to assign to the informed agent a higher value of 
α  in ex ante in order to obtain the higher probability of collusion-proofness. 
However, increasingα  also incurs higher implementation costs
*(, ) Tv α . At the 
equilibrium, the optimal value of α  is determined by solving the principal’s 
optimization program, which is expressed as follows:   
*
10 {} () m a x 2 [ ( 1 ) ] (, ) Vv R T v
α απα π α =+ − −  



















= is the benefit-cost ratio of agent’s effort, which measures the average 
benefit-cost of implementing the high effort level.   
















imply that the optimal 
collusion-proof probability increases with the benefit-cost ratio, as well as the 
discrimination factorv. Therefore, if 1 λ   , that is, if high effort levels create much 
more benefits than costs, then the efficient effort levels can be implemented virtually 
under hidden the discrimination mechanism.   
 
6. d Extension to the Mutually Observable Case 
     In the basic framework of section 3, we assume that the agents’ effort levels are 
only privately observable, which excludes the possibility of mutual monitoring. The 
assumption of privately observable effort brings forth further constraints of moral  20
hazard in the coalition, which may incur the loss of efficiency. However, under the 
hidden discrimination mechanism, this assumption can be relaxed, as the coalition 
incentive compatibility constraints are irrelevant in the program of side contracting. 
This implies that the validity of the hidden discrimination mechanism can be extended 
to the case of mutually observable effort.   
    In the situation where we have mutual observable efforts and verifiable 
performance, Itoh (1993) has shown that the Collusion-Proof Revelation Principle 
does not hold.  By permitting side contracting between agents and rewarding the 
coalition with collective bonus, the principal can benefit from mutual monitoring and 
risk sharing between agents. However, this result falls apart in tournaments with 
non-verifiable performance, as the principal cannot reward agents based on their joint 
performance.  
    Assume that agents can mutually observe their effort levels, and consider the 
hidden discrimination mechanism in section 6. The program of side contracting can be 
reduced by eliminating four coalition incentive compatibility constraints[( ) ]
i
l CIC e , 
[( ) ]
i
u CIC e and[( ) ]
j
l CIC e ,  [( ) ]
j
u CIC e as well as two other truth-telling constraints 
[( ) ]
i
l TM e and  [( ) ]
i
u TM e . All these constraints are irrelevant in the proof of the 
possibility theorem, which implies that the theorem still holds in this case: 
[Proposition 5]:   Assume agents can mutually observe their efforts. Under the 
hidden discrimination mechanism, it is possible to implement the efficient effort 
paire . 
    The result that moral hazard in the coalition is irrelevant to collusion-proofness 
should not be surprising. While moral hazard imposes further constraints on the 
coalition and brings on conflicts, the trade-off can be resolved by reducing the virtual 
incentive power, which entails no cost under perfect collusion. In hidden 
discrimination mechanism, only asymmetric information plays a key role in 
preventing collusion.   
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
     Tackling collusion is a permanent challenge faced by politicians and scholars, 
and therefore deserves more attention in both practice and research. The research on 
collusion-proof mechanism design has made much progress after being pioneered by 
Tirole (1986), but still leaves many questions unanswered, as argued in Tirole (1992). 
A brief investigation of the literature shows that the existing mechanisms for 
collusion-proofness are too simple, especially under the framework of moral hazard. 
Therefore, more sophisticated mechanisms have appeal to be explored to tackle the 
issue, which constitutes the main purpose of this paper. 
    The main contribution of this paper is to introduce the principle of “divide and  21
conquer” as an effective way to deter coalition formation. Discrimination and 
manipulation of information are introduced into a simple tournament model and are 
proven to be effective to prevent collusion. As a result, efficient effort levels are 
possible to be implemented under the hidden discrimination mechanism, which breaks 
down the impossibility theorem by Ishiguro (2004). 
    Although the principle of “divide and conquer” is an old idea to politicians and 
sociologists, it is relatively new to economists. Therefore, further developments of 
this principle and its applications in different settings are expected in future. 
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